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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The plaintiff, Davis County (hereinafter "Davis County"), suffered 
property damage to one of its police cruisers. This property damage was caused 
by the negligence of James Jensen (hereinafter "Jensen"). Progressive 
Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Progressive") insured 
Jensen and his vehicle, but it refused to defend or indemnify him. Davis 
County sued Progressive based on a cause of action created by UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31A-22-201. The trial court dismissed all claims based on its conclusion 
that this Court's prior ruling constituted res judicata and that Davis County 
still lacks "standing." The appellant is Davis County, and the Appellee is 
Progressive, civil number 060904637. (R. 1). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 
78-2-2(3)(j), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). And this matter was poured 
over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4), UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1953, as amended). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On November 14, 2007 the trial court issued an order granting 
Progressive's motion for summary judgment and denying Davis County's 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 151). The order declared that Davis 
County lacked standing and that the prior appeal was res judicata. (R. 151). 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on December 12, 2007. (R. 153). 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. The district court ruling was made under authority granted 
by Rule 56, and the questions are all founded upon the question of whether 
the legal determinations of the district court were proper. REVIEWED FOR 
CORRECTNESS. Rinderknecht v. Luck. 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App, 1998) 
("This appeal is from a summary judgment, which is granted only when 'there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Inasmuch as a 
challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, 
because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, this 
Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions.' Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 
(Utah 1989) (per curiam). Accord Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)."). 
B. Does Davis County have standing under Section 201? 
Reviewed for correctness. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-201. 
C. Did the Jensen I court rule on the merits? Reviewed for 
correctness. See Nokes v. Continental Min. & Milling Co.. 308 P.2d 954 (Utah 
1957) (explaining that Article VIII, § 9 [at the time] authorized an appellate 
court to set aside findings "and another finding made only if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against his finding"); UTAH CONST. Art. VIII, §§ 1, 3, 4. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
31A-22-201. Required provisions of liability insurance policies. 
Every liability insurance policy shall provide that the bankruptcy or 
insolvency of the insured may not diminish any liability of the insurer to third 
parties, and that if execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied, an 
action may be maintained against the insurer to the extent that the liability is 
covered by the policy. 
31A-22-202. Protection of third-party claimants. 
No insurance contract insuring against loss or damage through legal liability 
for the bodily injury or death by accident of any person, or for damage to the 
property of any person may be retroactively abrogated to the detriment of any 
third-party claimant by any agreement between the insurer and insured after 
the occurrence of any injury, death, or damage for which the insured may be 
liable. This attempted abrogation is void. 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed --
Rules of equity prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Progressive Insurance Company insured James Jensen 
and his vehicle. Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 444,11 3. 
2. Jensen is legally liable for damages to Davis County's property. Id. 
at 114. 
3. Progressive refused to defend or indemnify Jensen based on its 
interpretation of its insurance policy. Id. at 11 3. 
4. Davis County and Progressive were both named in the lawsuit 
against Jensen. Id. at 11 4. 
5. Judge Allphin ruled that Progressive's refusal to defend or 
indemnify was lawful. Id. at 11 5. 
6. Davis County appealed Judge Allphin's ruling. Id. at 11 7. 
7. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims 
against Progressive based on Davis County's lack of "standing." L i at n. 7. 
8. Davis County was unable to locate Jensen. (R. 73). 
9. As a result, Davis County did not file any papers in the court 
relating to execution against Jensen. (R. 73). 
10. Davis County brought this new lawsuit alleging that it had 
satisfied the statutory prerequisite by trying to find Jensen because the law 
does not require any futile act. (R. 1). 
11. Progressive defended this new lawsuit arguing that the "execution 
returned unsatisfied" prerequisite was not satisfied by Davis County's inability 
to find Jensen and that Davis County, as a result, still lacks standing. (R. 10). 
12. Progressive defended this new lawsuit arguing that the Jensen I 
ruling precludes this litigation under the doctrine of res judicata. (R. 10). 
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13. The district court granted Progressive's motion for summary 
judgment on the bases set forth above in ITU 11-12. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Progressive holds money that belongs to Davis County. It issued a policy 
of automobile liability insurance to James Jensen. Davis County has a 
judgment against James Jensen. That judgment established Jensen's legal 
liability, and Jensen's legal liability triggered Progressive's obligation to 
provide indemnification to Jensen. 
This appeal arose from a separate cause of action directly against 
Progressive pursuant to what is colloquially called a direct-action statute. 
Since this cause of action is new, res judicata cannot apply. Plaintiff has 
"standing" because the general conditions set forth in the direct-action statute 
were satisfied as a result of Jensen having disappeared. 
The application of res judicata requires that the following three elements 
be met: (1) judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) identity of the 
parties or parties in privity in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause of 
action in both suits. The merits of the coverage cause of action were not 
addressed by the panel in the prior appeal, the panel ruled that Davis County 
was not in "privity" with Jensen or Progressive, and the panel limited its 
analysis to tort law without addressing Progressive's contractual duty to 
indemnify Jensen by paying the judgment. 
Liability coverage is mandatory under Utah law. Its purpose is to protect 
innocent third-parties like Davis County. 
The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that Davis County lacked "standing" to 
5 
bring a cause of action against Progressive. Since Davis County was held to 
lack "standing," this Court declined to reach the merits of Davis County's prior 
appeal. Since the merits were not reached by this Court in the prior appeal, 
the ruling of the Second District Court cannot have any preclusive effect. 
Judge Henriod ruled that the condition contained in the so-called direct -
action statute was not satisfied. The ruling was legal error because the law 
requires nothing more than what Plaintiff did. Plaintiff was unable to obtain a 
writ of execution because Plaintiff could not find Jensen. The effort to locate 
Jensen coupled with the inability to locate Jensen satisfies the statutory 
language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-201 which stipulates that an action may 
be maintained against the insurer "if execution against the insured is returned 
unsatisfied . . . ." 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. JENSEN IS LEGALLY LIABLE. 
Jensen damaged a vehicle driven by Sergeant Gleave and owned by Davis 
County. Davis County sued Jensen for property damage. Jensen owed a duty 
of due care to Davis County, he breached the duty of due care, his breach 
proximately caused injury to property, and damages resulted from the injury. 
As a result, a judgment was entered against Jensen in the sum of $17,209.88. 
Progressive was not alleged to have breached a duty of due care to avoid 
injuring Davis County's property. Therefore, it was not joined as a party to the 
tort claim1 which was brought against Jensen. Instead, Progressive was joined 
to enforce its contractual promise to indemnify Jensen for his legal liability. 
The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that "Davis County cannot bring a cause of 
action in contract directly against Progressive." Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 
UT App 444,11 19 (hereinafter "Jensen I"). 
II. PROGRESSIVE IS CONTRACTUALLY LIABLE. 
A liability carrier owes indemnification to its insured when its insured is 
"legally liable."2 Legal liability is the "trigger" of coverage. Proof of legal 
1
 Under UTAH R. Civ. P. 8, "claim" is synonymous with "cause of action" 
and should be distinguished from Jensen's insurance "claim" that Progressive 
should have paid. 
2
 Liability insurance coverage typically requires a jury trial before its 
contractual performance is required because the insurer's obligation under a 
liability policy rests on its insured's tort liability and tort liability is determined 
by a jury or other finder of fact. Other types of insurance coverage are very, 
very different. "For example, unlike damages for which a tortfeasor is 
responsible, an insurer's liability [under UIM coverage] is contingent upon 
performance of the insured's obligations under the contract. Moreover, an 
insurer's exposure is limited by the amount of the premiums the insured 
agreed to pay. These features of the underinsured motorist contract, and 
7 
liability (e.g., a judgment) is the consideration that an insured owes to the 
insurer and receipt of that consideration by the insurer triggers the insurer's 
obligation to provide reciprocal consideration under the terms of the contract. 
Courts never weigh the consideration specified in an integrated contract. 
Therefore, when an insurer is notified of its insured's legal liability, it must 
immediately perform according to the terms set forth in the fully integrated3 
contract. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-202 (forbidding retroactive 
abrogation of insurance by agreement4 in order to protect third-party 
claimants). 
When (a) two parties have a contract, (b) the performance due from the 
party whose performance is first in time has been provided, and (c) the party 
whose performance is second in time has refused to perform, the second party 
has breached its contract. The contract is then executory and may be enforced 
actions for its breach, illustrate that the insurer does not simply step into the 
shoes of the tortfeasor, or his liability insurer, to make the insured whole. 
Rather, the accident victim's claim for damages arises out of the terms of her 
contract with her insurer—not out of her underlying injuries." Estate of 
Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance Company of Midwest. 2004 UT 104,11 17. 
3
 Insurance policies are fully integrated and that conclusion requires no 
analysis or extrinsic evidence. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106. The legislature 
weighed the relative interests of the parties and struck the balance in favor of 
the injured third party. See, e.g.. Branch v. Wester Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 
267, 276 (Utah 1982) (discussing the violation of a statutory prohibition 
relating to reasonableness of conduct under nuisance per se claim). 
4
 "[A]greement" should be read broadly in order to encompass omissions 
such as Progressive's refusal to indemnify its insured, refusal to defend its 
insured and its failure to locate its insured. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521(1) 
(defining felony insurance fraud to include omissions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-
31-103(3) (defining insurance fraud to include omissions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-26-301 (requiring prompt payment of all claims to and on behalf of first-
party claimants and guidelines to identify valid claims); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-26-303 (defining unfair claims settlement practices and requiring insurers 
to implement standards). 
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by the party or his creditors. Progressive breached its contract when it refused 
to indemnify Jensen for his legal liability. 
III. DAVIS COUNTY HAS "STANDING."5 
As discussed above, Davis County did not bring a "direct action"6 against 
Progressive in the litigation analyzed in Jensen I. Strictly speaking, a direct 
action is an action that includes an insurer as a defendant together with the 
tortfeasor and disregards the tort-based and contract-based principles and 
distinctions explained above.7 
Davis County joined Progressive as a party asking the Court to place 
ultimate responsibility for the loss upon the one whom in good conscience it 
5
 "Standing" is an uncertain term with no fixed definition. Article III of 
the United States Constitution imposes a case or controversy requirement 
from which a standing doctrine has been developed. But the definition relied 
upon by the Jensen I panel is not clear. 
6
 "Direct action" is an uncertain term with no fixed definition. The 
Jensen I panel distinguished precedent relating to actions to recover on 
insurance policies by third parties. "The policy contained the usual provision 
that a judgment creditor of the insured may bring such a suit." Peterson v. 
Western Casualtv & Suretv Co.. 19 Utah 2d 26, 425 P.2d 769 (1967); Jensen I 
at 1117; but see the direct-action clause in Progressive's policy: 
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US 
We may not be sued for payment under Part I - Liability To 
Others until the obligation of an insured person to pay is 
finally determined either by final judgment against that person 
or by written agreement of the insured person, the claimant 
and us. 
* * * 
Progressive's policy, at p. 38 (underlining added). Presumably (implicitly), the 
Jensen I panel viewed that clause as a condition to a separate cause of action. 
7
 A direct action should be distinguished from a declaratory judgment 
action and an inurement statute. 
9 
ought to fall. Equity and the general procedural mechanism referred to as 
"subrogation" is not at all concerned with "privity."8 
It is true, generally, that one who is not a party to a contract may not 
recover for its breach. See National Cash Register Co. V. Unarco Ind., 490 F.2d 
285, 286 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing, Vanderlaan v. Berry Construction Co., 255 
N.E.2d 615 (111. 1970)). Like all general rules, there are numerous exceptions. 
Moreover, the general rule only applies to circumstances for which it was 
developed. 
One of the exceptions is the equitable doctrine of subrogation which is 
usually broadly interpreted to dispense justice. IcL at 286-87; compare Davis 
County v. Jensen 2003 UT App at 1118 (lamenting the inequity of the panel's 
decision to construe subrogation narrowly). Broad interpretation is especially 
appropriate in the context of the statutory contract that the Utah Legislature 
required Jensen to enter into with Progressive under penalty of criminal 
sanction.9 
The holding of Jensen I was that Davis County "lack[ed] standing." 
Jensen 2003 UT App at n. 7. In other words, the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. The narrow view taken by the Jensen I panel, without more, 
would tend to undermine the goal of protection for injured motorists and 
prompt recovery of losses. The court's holding must be viewed in the context 
of Section 201. 
8
 "Privity" is an uncertain term with no fixed definition. For this 
reason, the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments abandoned the 
term "privity" altogether. See American Polled Hererford v. City of Kansas 
Citv. 626 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo. 1982). 
9
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (imposing criminal sanctions, a class B 
misdemeanor, for any motorist's failure to join the risk pool). 
10 
A, The Narrow View Precluded a Determination on the 
Merits 
The narrow view of subrogation in the context of Jensen I prevented 
adjudication of the merits based upon the Court's determination that it, and by 
necessary implication the district court, lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of claims made by a party lacking "standing" to contest Progressive's 
refusal to pay Jensen's claim. Since it determined that it lacked jurisdiction, 
the Jensen I panel declined to reach the underlying merits. Id "It is axiomatic 
that res judicata claim preclusion and rules against splitting a cause of action 
are inapplicable when a statute explicitly prohibits inclusion of additional 
claims in the original action." Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard 
Oil Company. Inc., 2007 ND 36,1117 (discussing North Dakota's eviction 
statute which forbids extraneous claims). 
B. The Narrow View Is Consistent with Section 201 
Without more, the Jensen I panel's interpretation of subrogation would 
undermine mandatory insurance. But, in this case, there is more. 
There is a statute that creates an independent cause of action that 
accrues subsequent to an insurer's breach of its contract and obviates the 
necessity for a court to resort to equity. In other words, an innocent victim 
does not lose the rights that would be provided in equity because the 
legislature has supplanted equity with a separate cause of action. 
The Jensen I panel's holding can be harmonized with traditional 
11 
principles of equity, public policy underlying mandatory insurance, and 
protection of innocent third-parties who suffer injury. The harmony was 
analyzed by the Utah Supreme Court in Speros v. Fricke and its interpretation 
of the separate cause of action that arises when an insurer breaches its 
contract by refusing to indemnify its insured. 
1155 West American is entitled to reimbursement from 
Nationwide if it attempted unsuccessfully to execute on its 
judgment against Hiatt. Hiatt is now deceased, and all 
indications in the record suggest that execution against 
Hiatt's estate would prove futile. Nevertheless, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that West American actually 
attempted an execution against Hiatt that was returned 
unsatisfied. Because an unsatisfied attempt to execute 
on a judgment against an insured is a prerequisite 
element of West American's right to pursue a direct 
action against Nationwide, we remand to the trial court 
for a finding on this issue. 
Speros v. Fricke. 2004 UT 69, U 55. 
Stated differently, the Jensen I court's determination that Davis County 
did not have a contract claim directly against Progressive can be explained by 
the general rule in equity that the existence of a right of action at law prevents 
jurisdiction in the chancery court. Since Davis County's cause of action had 
10
 The Jensen I panel's holding that since there was no right under the 
contract, "therefore," there was no equitable right would be clear error were it 
not for the harmony provided by Section 201. The absence of a legal right was 
a condition precedent to access to equitable relief in the chancery courts. 
Satisfaction of the condition precedent necessary for relief in equity cannot 
"therefore" result in a denial of equitable relief unless the creditor's bill were a 
separate claim at law under Section 201. Since appellate rulings provide gloss 
for statutes and statutes are to be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
and not inoperable, an interpretation that renders the holding absurd should 
not be presumed. Alternatively, it was mere dicta. Alternatively, more harm 
than good would flow from not overruling the statement. "Under the doctrine 
of stare decisis, [a court should] follow [its] "own precedents . . . unless [it is] 
clearly convinced that the [precedent] was originally erroneous or is no longer 
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come 
by departing from precedent." State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
12 
not yet accrued at the time of Jensen L it could not have been fully and fairly 
litigated. Since it was not fully and fairly litigated, res judicata cannot apply to 
this separate action. 
C. The Absence of Standing Prevented Full Litigation 
The doctrine of res judicata effects an estoppel against parties. Those 
over whom a court acquires jurisdiction may be bound by the decisions reached 
by that court as to specific issues and claims. And those decisions will be 
conclusive as against those parties in subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Lawlor v. 
National Screen Service Corp.. 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) (under Article III 
parties generally may not relitigate an issue that was litigated and actually 
decided, and whose resolution was necessary to the prior judgment). 
Davis County was not a party because the Utah Court of Appeals ruled 
that it lacked "standing."11 Therefore, Judge Allphin's ruling was vacated by 
implication. 
Although Davis County was named in the underlying litigation, 
Progressive defended that action based on its assertion that Davis County 
11
 The "standing" ruling is not very clear. There are multiple standing 
doctrines: constitutional standing, prudential standing, contractual standing, 
etc. And most of these doctrines are only relevant in Article III courts. See 
Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) ("Unlike the federal system, the 
judicial power of the state of Utah is not constitutionally restricted by the 
language of Article III of the United States Constitution requiring 'cases' and 
'controversies,' since no similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution. 
We previously have held that 'this Court may grant standing where matters of 
great public interest and societal impact are concerned.' Jenkins v. State, 
Utah, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (footnote omitted). However, the requirement 
that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal dispute is 
rooted in the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary in Utah."). The 
Utah Court of Appeals conceded Davis County's personal stake in the outcome. 
13 
lacked "standing" to challenge its conclusions. The Utah Court of Appeals 
agreed with that contention. 
The Jensen court ruled: "The County cannot bring a cause of action in 
contract directly against Progressive." Jensen, 2003 UT App 444,1119 n. 7, 83 
P.3d 405; See, e.g., Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges. 
541 F.2d 890 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that where the district court had expressly 
refused to consider an issue in an earlier contract litigation, plaintiff was not 
precluded from arguing the issue in a subsequent proceeding between the same 
parties). Since the County was barred from bringing a claim against 
Progressive at that time, it cannot be estopped from challenging Progressive's 
interpretation of its policy in this separate litigation. 
D. The Appellate Opinion Is Only Authority for What it 
Actually Decided 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that Judge Allphin's court lacked 
jurisdiction to decide arguments provided by Davis County. Since Judge 
Allphin's court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits as a result of the 
"standing" determination, any opinions from that court cannot support a 
finding ofres judicata. The appellate opinion supplanted the trial court's 
opinion in the same way an amended complaint supplants the original 
complaint. 
Our principal difficulty with this ruling is that the St. Pierre 
I summary judgment dismissed St. Pierre's original claims 
not on their merits but only for lack of Article III standing. 
See St.Pierrel, 1993 WL 85757, at *3 (granting defendants' 
motions which were "tantamount to a challenge to plaintiffs' 
standing to maintain this action"); St. Pierre II, 28 F.3d at 
275 ("[i]n a thorough opinion, the [St.Pierre i] court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants appellees on 
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the basis that St. Pierre lacked standing because the 
proceeds of the lapsed policy were payable not to St. Pierre, 
but rather to Kenworth and another"); id, at 276 
("affirm[ing] substantially for the reasons stated in the 
opinion of the district court"); St, Pierre HI, 21 F.Supp.2d at 
140 (noting that the St, Pierre I court "granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on the ground that because the 
proceeds of the insurance policy were payable to Kenworth 
rather than to St. Pierre, St. Pierre lacked standing to 
maintain the action"). Since a dismissal for lack of Article III 
standing is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
see, e.g., Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co,, 72 F.3d 1085, 
1091 (2d Cir. 1995); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 
F.3d at 247-49, the St^Pierrel judgment has no res 
judicata effect with respect to most of St.Pierre's claims. 
St. Pierre and Que-Van Transport v. Dver. 208 F.3d 394, 400 (2nd Cir. 1999) 
(bold added). 
E, The Appellate Opinion Supplanted Judge Allphin's Ruling 
The decision by Judge Allphin was implicitly vacated because the Court 
of Appeals refused to recognize Davis County's standing. 
The view that an appeal creates a clean slate, so to speak, for 
purposes of res judicata, upon which the appellate court's 
grounds of decision are inscribed, has been said to be 
supported by "the great weight [ ] of judicial and scholarly 
opinion." Hannahville Indian Community v. United States, 
180 Ct.CL 477, 485 (1967). 
12
 "A finding of the trial court not passed upon by an appellate court 
because it was unnecessary for the appellate court's decision does not leave 
that finding res judicata between the parties. See e,g., Moran Towing & 
Transportation Co, v, Navigazione Liberia Triestina, 92 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1937), 
cert, denied, 302 U.S. 744, 58 S.Ct. 145, 82 L.Ed. 575 (1937); Reighley v. 
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co, of Chicago, 323 Ill.App. 479, 56 
N.E.2d 328 (1944); State v. Missouri Public Service Corp., 351 Mo. 961, 174 
S.W.2d 871 (1948), cert, denied 321 U.S. 793, 64 S.Ct. 786, 88 L.Ed. 1082 
(1944); Spreyer, Inc, v, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co,, 222 Pa.Super. 261, 295 
A.2d 143 (1972); Sterling National Bank & Trust Co, of New York v. 
Charleston Transit Co,, 126 W.Va. 42, 27 S.E.2d 256 (1943), cert, denied 321 
U.S. 777, 64 S.Ct. 619, 88 L.Ed. 1071 (1944)." Nodland v. NokotaCo.. 314 
N.W.2d 89, 92 (N.D. 1981). 
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Spever. Inc. v. Goodvear Tire and Rubber Co. 295 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. 1972). 
The Jensen I court did not intend to both refuse to provide Davis County 
with a forum to have its dispute heard while simultaneously intending that 
Davis County would be bound by any determination in that litigation as a 
consequence of "standing." 
The bases for this rule are easy to discern. First, it is felt 
that, properly speaking, there is only one judgment in a case 
— the ultimate judgment, which is that of the appellate 
court. Second, it is clear that an appellate court's refusal to 
rest its affirmance on a certain finding is often indicative of 
an infirmity in the finding. Third, it has been held that to 
consider a party bound in later actions by a trial court's 
determination which was ignored on appeal is to deprive the 
party of a [constitutional13] right of appeal. And fourth, it 
would seem that a contrary rule would require considerable 
wariness on the part of an appellate court, in disposing of a 
case, lest it inadvertently leave questionable findings res 
judicata. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Even if the Jensen I decision were final in a procedural sense, Davis 
County still must have had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue for 
collateral estoppel to apply. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa 
NavieraSantaS.A., 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir.1995) (identifying a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate as one of several elements that must be met before 
collateral estoppel precludes further litigation). 
This action is brought to obtain money held by Progressive that belongs 
to Davis County. Progressive owes money to Jensen. It owes money to Jensen 
because it promised to indemnify him for his legal liability. And Jensen's legal 
liability was determined by the trial court's entry of a judgment against him for 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5. 
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$17,209.88.14 
While it is true that Judge Allphin ruled that Progressive did not owe 
Jensen any money, that ruling did not survive the appeal. The Utah Court of 
Appeals held that the County could never obtain a decision on the merits. 
Jensen at 1118. It held that no cause of action existed when it used the inapt 
phrase "standing." Since no cause of action was determined to have been at 
issue, the "merits" were not reached. Reaching the merits is another element 
of both branches of res judicata which fails.. 
IV. DAVIS COUNTY PROPERLY BROUGHT THIS 
SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION AND SATISFIED THE 
PREREQUISITE TO ACCRUAL OF ITS CLAIM. 
Section 201 must be read together with Section 202. And both sections 
should be read in the context of the rules of equity and the legislative purpose 
underlying mandatory automobile insurance. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-
2 (when there is a conflict between common law and equity "the rules of equity 
shall prevail."). 
A. The Statutory Prerequisite Was Satisfied 
The statutory prerequisite was satisfied by Davis County's inability to 
locate Jensen. 
14
 See Dyer, 208 F.3d at 401-02 ("The district court apparently did not 
conclude that St.Pierre failed to meet the first of these criteria; nor could it 
reasonably have so concluded, for St.Pierre is subject to a judgment requiring 
him to pay American Iron more than $100,000-an injury that is concrete, 
particular, and actual. Nor could the court properly have concluded, with 
respect to the third criterion, that the injury would not be redressed by a 
favorable decision on St.Pierre's complaint, for the complaint sought, inter alia, 
a monetary award to St.Pierre in the amount of the judgment against him."). 
17 
But, after all, the judgment and fruitless execution are only 
evidence that his legal remedies have been exhausted, or 
that he is without remedy at law. They are not the only 
possible means of proof. The necessity of resort to a court of 
equity may be made otherwise to appear. Accordingly the 
rule, though general, is not without many exceptions. 
Neither law nor equity requires a meaningless form, 'Bona, 
sed impossibilia non cogit lex' It has been decided that 
where it appears by the bill that the debtor is insolvent and 
that the issuing of an execution would be of no practical 
utility, the issue of an execution is not a necessary 
prerequisite to equitable interference. Turner v. Adams, 46 
Mo. 95; Postlewait & Creagan and Keeler v. Howes, 3 Iowa, 
365; Ticonie Bank v. Harvey, 16 id. 141; Botsford v. Beers, 11 
Conn. 369; Payne v. Sheldon, 63 Barb (N. Y.) 169. This is 
certainly true where the creditor has a lien or a trust in his 
favor. 
So it has been held that a creditor, without having first 
obtained a judgment at law, may come into a court of equity 
to set aside fraudulent conveyances of his debtor, made for 
the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors, and to 
subject the property to the payment of the debt due him. 
Thurmond and Others v. Reese, 3 Ga. 449; Cornell v. 
Radway, 22 Wis. 260; Sanderson v. Stockdale, 11 Md. 563. 
Case v. Beauregard, 101 U.S. 688, 25 L.Ed. 1004 (1879). 
B, The Statute at Issue Arose out of Equity 
The statute providing that an insurance company cannot avoid its 
obligations is intended to provide a mechanism for prompt reimbursement to 
victims, to aid in the proper administration of the insurance statutes, and to 
explicitly adopt equitable principles to promote, rather than to defeat, the 
interests of justice. "The rule requiring a judgment was a product, not just of 
the procedural requirement that remedies at law had to be exhausted before 
equitable remedies could be pursued, but also of the substantive rule that a 
general creditor (one without a judgment) had no cognizable interest, either at 
law or in equity, in the property of his debtor, and therefore could not interfere 
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with the debtor's use of that property." Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v 
Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). 
The phrase, "execution returned unsatisfied"15 is merely an 
admonishment that courts of chancery will not ordinarily exercise their powers 
if courts of law are available to provide a remedy. 
This matter is properly characterized as an action "quasi in rem'' It is a 
dispute over the status and ownership of funds held by Progressive. It can also 
be described as an equitable lien. 
In the language of chancery courts, this action is a creditor's bill16 — a 
15
 The phrase is used in common law garnishment which required 
execution prior to garnishment in aid of execution, principal-surety law, 
bankruptcy law, receivership law, fraudulent conveyances and many other 
areas of the law. See, ^g,, Buttles v. Smith. 281 N.Y. 226, 22 N.E.2d 350, 353 
(1939) ("Where an action is brought under * * * section 15 of the Stock 
Corporation Law, no cause of action accrues to a creditor [of the 
corporation] until judgment has been obtained and execution returned 
unsatisfied."); Cortez v. Vogt 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853, 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 936 
(Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1997) (" ... [T]his statute simply abrogates 'the ancient rule 
whereby a judgment and a lien were essential preliminaries to equitable relief 
against a fraudulent conveyance', and that what it 'seeks' is to level 
'distinctions that at times had been the refuge of the dilatory debtor.' American 
Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 7, 166 N.E. 783, 785, 65 A.L.R. 244. After all, 
the fraudulent grantor cannot complain, for as to him the obligation is a 
subsisting one until the statutory period has run against the judgment. As to 
his grantee, who holds only an apparent title, a mere cloak under which is 
hidden the hideous skeleton of deceit, the real owner being the scheming and 
shifty judgment debtor,-what reason has he to complain when the six year 
statute giving repose to the remedy has not expired since entry of judgment?"). 
16
 "A creditor's suit is an equitable action to satisfy a judgment 'out of 
the equitable assets of the debtor which could not be reached on execution.' 
Wadsworth v. Schisselbaur, 32 Minn. 84, 86, 19 N.W. 390, 390 (1884). A 
creditor's suit is 'in essence an equitable execution comparable to proceedings 
supplementary to execution.' Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 401-402, 41 
S.Ct. 365, 65 L.Ed. 697 (1921) (citation omitted). The general rule in 
Minnesota is that a creditor is: required first to exhaust his remedy at law by 
the issuance of an execution and its return unsatisfied, for until then the 
remedy at law had not been shown to be inadequate, hind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 
204 Minn. 30, 37, 282 N.W. 661, 666 (1938) (citing Moffatt v. Tuttle, 35 Minn. 
301, 28 N.W. 509 (1886))." Brakemeier v. Wittek. 386 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. App. 
19 
suit to enforce an equitable claim to property. From the moment that 
execution has been returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor has a claim to 
the equitable assets of the judgment debtor. Utah Coop. Ass'n v. White 
Distrib. & Supply Co.. 2 Utah 2d 391, 275 P.2d 687 (Utah 1954) ("Equity will 
not permit him to thus unjustly enrich himself, but will impose a constructive 
trust upon his interest in the property to protect the White Corporation, and 
its creditor, the plaintiff, which stands in its shoes."). 
The Utah statute provides that a new cause of action accrues subsequent 
to the entry of the judgment against the judgment debtor and fruitless 
execution. This new cause of action was not addressed much less resolved. 
A judgment creditor's claim is not merely one in personam against the 
debtor; he had that claim before judgment. He has a claim quasi in rem 
against such things as surplus trust income and any other property not subject 
to execution at law, which claim he may assert and enforce by creditor's bill.17 
Whatever logical or historical distinctions separate the 
jurisdictions of equity and law, and with whatever effect 
those distinctions may be supposed to be recognized in the 
Constitution, we are not of opinion that the proceeding in 
question partakes so exclusively of the nature of either that 
it may not be authorized, indifferently, as an instrument of 
justice in the hands of courts of whatever description. 
Ex parte Bovd. 105 U.S. 647, 658, 26 L.Ed. 1200 (1881). 
1986). 
17
 Miller v. Sherry. 2 Wall. 237, 69 U.S. 237, 245, 17 L.Ed. 827 (1864) 
("Under the rule, thus interpreted, all parties can obtain their rights, when 
fixed, without conflict, and in a manner least expensive, and according to sound 
principles of equity."). 
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C, Equity Will Not Permit Procedural Disputes to 
Thwart Justice 
It is an accepted maxim that equity "looks beneath the rigid rules of the 
law to seek substantial justice. It has the power to prevent such rules from 
working an injustice, and will depart therefrom whenever it is necessary to 
accomplish the ends of justice." 30 C.J.S. Equity, § 89. Toward that end, the 
condition precedent that an execution be returned unsatisfied has easily been 
satisfied by Davis County. 
In short, the evidence was overwhelming that the insured 
was judgment proof. Nonetheless, appellee points out that 
appellants "did not file any documents with respect to 
attempting to satisfy the judgment." Under these 
circumstances, however, the evidence was conclusive that to 
do so would have been an exercise in futility, as well as a 
monumental waste of money. This evidence of total 
insolvency, in our view, is sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement that the judgment against the insured must be 
returned unsatisfied, or that the insured must refuse to pay 
it, before the injured party may directly sue the insurer. 
Woodfm Equities Corp. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Md.App. 616, 638 (Md. 
App. 1995). Utah law is in accord with the principles articulated by the 
Maryland court. 
It is no doubt generally true that a creditor's bill to subject 
his debtor's interests in property to the payment of the debt 
must show that all remedy at law had been exhausted. And 
generally, it must be averred that judgment has been 
recovered for the debt; that execution has been issued, and 
that it has been returned nulla bona. The reason is that 
until such a showing is made, it does not appear, in most 
cases, that resort to a court of equity is necessary, or in other 
words, that the creditor is remediless at law. In some cases, 
also, such an averment is necessary to show that the creditor 
has a lien upon the property he seeks to subject to the 
payment of his demand. The rule is a familiar one, that a 
court of equity will not entertain a case for relief where the 
complainant has an adequate legal remedy. The complaining 
party must, therefore, show that he had done all that he 
could do at law to obtain his rights. 
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Case v. Beauregard. 101 U.S. 688, 25 L.Ed. 1004 (1879). 
Judge Learned Hand explained how equitable authority is properly 
applied to the condition of a return nulla bona. 
In the case at bar the supplemental bill alleged that the 
Practical Company had been left an "empty shell." This was 
not proved, because, for all that appeared, it had accounts 
receivable which made it solvent. On the other hand, all 
property leviable by execution had been conveyed, for in New 
York choses in action can still be reached only by bill in 
equity ("supplementary proceedings"). McNeeley v. Welz, 166 
N. Y. 124, 59 N. E. 697. It appears to us unnecessary to 
go to the extreme of the New York decisions, and say 
that execution and a return nulla bona are 
conditions, when it appears that all the debtor's 
property which could be reached by the writ had 
already been conveyed. U. S. v. Fairall (D. C.) 16 F.(2d) 
328; Bird v. Murphy, 72 Cal. App. 39, 236 P. 154; O'Brien v. 
Stambach, 101 Iowa, 40, 69 N. W. 1133, 63 Am. St. Rep. 368; 
Balsley v. Union Cypress Co. (Fla.) 110 So. 263; Rice v. 
McJohn, 244 111. 264, 91 N. E. 448. Being free to decide in 
accordance with what seem to us the general equitable 
principles controlling, we cannot see why we should insist 
upon what would have been an idle gesture. 
Empire Lighting Fixture Co. v. Practical Lighting Fixture Co.. 20 F.2d 295, 297 
(2nd Cir. 1927).18 
A Utah court entered a judgment in favor of Davis County on the merits, 
18
 See id. at pp. 296-97 ("A fraudulent conveyance is void under the New 
York statute, and may be disregarded, even by a creditor whose judgment is 
entered afterwards. Chautauque Bank v. Risley, 19 N. Y. 369, 75 Am. Dec. 347; 
Bergen v. Carman, 79 N. Y. 146; Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568, 31 N. E. 1082. A 
suit to set it aside is not therefore essential, but is only an alternative remedy. 
It clears the title of the creditor in limine, and is in aid of the principal purpose 
of the suit; it "is in substance an equitable execution." Dewey v. West Fairmont 
Gas Coal Co., 123 U. S. 329, 333, 8 S. Ct. 148, 31 L. Ed. 179; Hobbs v. Gooding 
(C. C.) 164 F. 91; Id., 176 F. 259 (C. C. A. 1). Cook v. Beecher (C. C.) 172 F. 166, 
affirmed 217 U. S. 497, 30 S. Ct. 601, 54 L. Ed. 855, was quite another case. 
There the plaintiff tried to hold the directors of a company upon their liability 
as such for a judgment rendered against it. Such a liability is not an 
incident to the collection of the judgment itself, but an independent 
cause of action."). 
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and execution has been "returned unsatisfied" because Jensen cannot be 
found. (R. 73). The judgment debtor has equitable assets of considerable value 
located within the jurisdiction of this Court. But Progressive argues that the 
judgment debtor, by removing himself from the state or remaining hidden, can 
baffle the judgment creditor and render the court powerless to enforce its own 
judgment. If this argument is tenable, it is a reproach to our system of 
administering justice. 
Moreover, it is contrary to fundamental principles guiding courts of 
equity. "Courts of equity are to do equity and compel fair dealing; they are not 
to aid in clever attempts to escape just obligations." 30 C.J.S. Equity, § 89 at n. 
39. 
D. The Money Held by Progressive Is Held in a Constructive 
Trust 
Progressive has held money since 1998 that is the rightful property of 
Davis County. Progressive has held these funds in a constructive trust. 
Progressive has managed to hold this property for its own benefit because of its 
refusal to defend its insured and its failure to come with clean hands into this 
Court.19 By refusing to defend Jensen, Progressive rendered this litigation 
more difficult and expensive. It also has erected artificial barriers to the 
19
 See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT 72,1119 ("an 
insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the 
claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to properly assess the 
law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in 
litigation."); Smith v. American Family Ins. Co.. 294 N.W.2d 751, 760 (N.D. 
1980) (holding that post-disclaimer threat by insurer to sue insured's counsel 
for abuse of process is admissible in action regarding "handling [of the] claim"); 
Soblev v. Southern Natural Gas Co.. 302 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that all insurers operate under a continuing duty to 
periodically reevaluate claims denials). 
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administration of justice through the breach of its fiduciary obligation to 
defend its insured. These actions epitomize bad faith. 
Its actions, if affirmed, would reward unfair dealing rather than 
compelling fair dealing. A court of equity will not allow itself to be used for 
unjust purposes. 
Moreover, the holder of property in a constructive trust is subject to the 
same duties owed by any other trustee. To wit, Progressive owes duties of 
competence and honesty. It also owes a duty to refrain from self-dealing. 
Progressive should be removed as constructive trustee ex maleficio. 90 
C.J.S. Trusts § 232. It has refused to follow the instructions inherent in the 
trust — that it honor the judgment of Second District Court. Id, It has 
displayed animosity and hostility toward the beneficiary of the trust by its 
refusal to perform and by escalating the litigation necessary to collect the sums 
it holds. L i And it has attempted to disclaim the existence of the trust and the 
equitable ownership of the money held in trust for the purpose of satisfying 
Davis County's judgment against its insured, Jensen. I d 
E. Progressive's Policy Unquestionably Provided Coverage 
for Jensen 
Progressive attempts to draw a distinction between Judge Allphin's 
interpretation of the term "accident" and the intentional acts exclusion. Its 
conclusion is without merit. However, some of its contentions leading to its 
conclusion are not wholly without merit under other, different circumstances. 
Therefore, some insurance law background is appropriate. 
The insuring clause of an insurance policy describes the covered 
24 
property20 or covered peril21 to which coverage may attach. An exception may 
reduce the breadth of the coverage described by the insuring clause. The 
coverage clause describes the scope of coverage to be provided by the insurer 
upon the happening of an event or condition described in the insuring clause. 
And an exclusion is an event or condition that may preclude the application of 
the coverage obligations despite the loss otherwise coming within the general 
purview of the described covered peril or covered property. 
Progressive's error arises from its failure to understand the definition of 
the covered peril contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303. Utah's 
insurance code does not limit coverage to what Progressive calls an "accident." 
The definition set forth in Section 303 describing the covered perils is a 
requirement which is binding upon all insurance companies doing business in 
Utah. IcL; compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (imposing criminal 
sanctions, a class B misdemeanor, for any motorist's failure to purchase 
insurance); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-31-103(3) (stating that an insurance 
company commits insurance fraud when inter alia it withholds information or 
provides false or misleading information in connection with an insurance 
claim). 
The Utah Supreme Court correctly determined that the covered perils 
required under Section 303 include an insured's "legal liability" without regard 
to how or why that legal liability accrued (i.e., coverage for all perils). The only 
20
 For example, collision coverage is a covered property policy. 
Therefore, coverage follows the property. 
21
 The Progressive coverage at issue is its PD liability coverage. This is a 
covered peril coverage. Therefore, coverage follows the person. Vehicles 
cannot owe or breach any legal duties — only people can be subject to the peril 
against which this coverage provides protection. 
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condition (i.e., exception) is that the liability must have accrued in connection 
with the ownership, use or maintenance of an automobile. 
In the case of an owner's liability policy, the statute requires 
that the policy insure the person named in the policy and 
any permissive users "against loss from the liability imposed 
by law for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the 
United States and Canada . . . in [dollar] amounts not less 
than the minimum limits specified." Id. § 
31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). 
1f43 The statute recognizes no distinction between 
liability arising out of negligent acts and liability 
arising out of intentional acts; it simply requires 
coverage for all liabilities imposed by law. Because the 
law imposes liability for damages caused negligently and 
intentionally, we conclude that the statute requires coverage 
of liability arising out of intentional, as well as negligent, 
acts. 
Speros v. Fricke. 2004 UT 69,1111 42-43, 98 P.3d 28. 
F. Determination of Progressive's Contractual Liability is 
Ripe 
Plaintiff could not, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-201, bring an action 
against Progressive until its cause of action as a judgment creditor accrued. 
Since the cause of action did not accrue until after entry of judgment and 
return of judgment unsatisfied, the prior ruling of Judge Allphin can have no 
preclusive effect. 
26 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's order should be reversed. This Court's remand order 
should direct the district court as follows: The district court shall immediately 
and without additional delay enter a judgment directing Progressive to pay the 
sum of $25,814.82 to Davis County. 
DATED this / p day of February, 2008. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
^ENTXWADDOI^S 
_Attorneys for Plaintiff / Appellant 
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The Court heard oral arguments on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and the plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on September 14, 2007. The 
plaintiff was represented by Trent J. Waddoups. The defendant was represented by 
Joseph J. Joyce. Having considered the parties' oral arguments, and having carefully 
reviewed and considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court does hereby 
make the following ORDER: 
1. Davis County lacks standing to bring a direct cause of action against 
Progressive under Utah §31A-22-201 because it has not made an attempt to execute 
judgment that has been returned unsatisfied. 
2. Davis County's claim that Progressive must provide insurance coverage for 
Jensen's conduct is barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion 
because Davis County was a party to the prior adjudication; the issue of Jensen's 
insurance coverage was decided in the prior adjudication; the issue of Jensen's insurance 
coverage was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and the first suit resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
' ORDER 
Wherefore, the Court does hereby GRANT the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and DENY the plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and does further 
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that the plaintiffs complaint against the defendant be 
and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice, upon the merits, with no costs awarded. 
DATED this *J day of /Hw^uVt-- , 2007. 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
11 Davis County appeals the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company. We 
affirm. 
u a v i a v_A^uin_y v . j t / i i^^i i r age z-uio 
BACKGROUND 
12 On June 20, 1998, James Jensen led police on a high-speed 
automobile chase. During the pursuit, Jensen, driving southbound on 
Interstate 15, attempted to cross the median into oncoming northbound 
traffic. Worried for the safety of other drivers, Sergeant Gleave of 
the Davis County Sheriff's Office maneuvered his cruiser along the 
driver-side of Jensen's vehicle, effectively blocking Jensen's 
intended path into the opposing traffic flow. Unfazed, Jensen 
continued toward the median until his vehicle impacted the passenger 
side of Sergeant Gleave's cruiser. Jensen's attempts to push the 
heavier cruiser out of the way proved unsuccessful, and Sergeant 
Gleave began pushing Jensen's car toward the right shoulder of the 
southbound lane. At this point, Jensen abruptly disengaged. The 
sudden lack of resistance caused Sergeant Gleave to lose control of 
his cruiser and collide with a semitrailer truck. The cruiser was 
deemed a total loss by insurance adjusters. Jensen later pleaded 
guilty to charges of aggravated assault, criminal mischief, and 
failure to stop at the command of a police officer. 
13 At the time of the incident, Jensen was covered as a permissive 
user under an automobile insurance policy (the Policy) with 
Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company (Progressive). Davis 
County (the County)*1* filed a claim with Progressive for damages to 
the police cruiser. Progressive determined that Jensen's conduct was 
intentional, not accidental, and therefore was not covered under the 
Policy.i^1 
14 After Progressive denied the claim, the County filed a negligence 
suit against Jensen and Progressive seeking to recover damages. 
Because Progressive believed Jensen's intentional criminal conduct 
excluded him from coverage under the Policy, Progressive did not 
provide a defense for Jensen. When Jensen failed to provide his own 
defense, the trial court entered a default judgment against him in 
the amount of $17,209.88. 
15 Thereafter, both Progressive and the County filed motions for 
summary judgment. Progressive argued it was entitled to summary 
judgment because the County had no standing to sue Progressive and 
because Jensen's intentional conduct was outside the scope of 
coverage, relieving Progressive of any duty to indemnify or defend 
Jensen. The County argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because the default judgment against Jensen conclusively 
established the factual allegations of negligence in the complaint, 
leaving Jensen's conduct squarely within the scope of coverage. 
Hence, the County argued that both the fact and the amount of 
Progressive's liability were conclusively established. The trial 
court denied the County's motion for summary judgment and granted 
Progressive's motion for summary judgment after concluding that 
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Progressive had no duty to indemnify or defend because Jensen's 
conduct placed him outside the scope of coverage under the Policy. 
The County appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 The County argues the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment to Progressive and denying the County judgment as a matter 
of law. "Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 68,114, 56 P.3d 524 (quotations and citations omitted). "When 
reviewing the trial court's order granting [Progressive's] summary 
judgment motion, we view the facts and reasonable factual inferences 
in the light most favorable to [the County], the nonmoving party." 
Id. We review the order granting summary judgment for correctness, 
according no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
17 The County argues the trial court erred in granting Progressive 
judgment as a matter of law. We disagree but affirm on the alternate 
ground of standing.-^~ 
18 Progressive argued below and now contends on appeal that the 
County lacks standing to bring this direct action against 
Progressive.* ^ We agree with Progressive. 
19 The County relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Northwestern National Insurance Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996), for 
the proposition that one insurer may bring a subrogation action 
against a second insurer. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., our supreme court noted: 
Utah law clearly recognizes an insurer's right to bring a subrogation 
action on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor . . . . More 
significantly, we have extended this principle to an action by an 
insurer against a second insurance company which is primarily liable 
to defend or pay any claims on behalf of its insured but which has 
denied coverage. 
Id. at 985. We conclude the County has read this language too 
broadly. 
110 The plaintiff in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. filed 
suit following an automobile accident involving Dalton, an employee 
of Dave's Texaco. See id. at 984. The accident resulted in personal 
injuries to the plaintiff and property damage to both the plaintiff's 
vehicle and the one Dalton was driving. See id. At the time of the 
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accident, Dalton was driving a vehicle he had borrowed from Puffer, 
his supervisor at Dave's Texaco, See id. Puffer carried an automobile 
insurance policy with State Farm, and Dalton was covered under that 
policy as a permissive user of Puffer's vehicle. See id. Northwestern 
National insured Dave's Texaco and, due to his status as an employee, 
Dalton was also covered under that policy. See id. Hence, Dalton's 
claims of coverage under both policies arose from contractual 
relationships between the insurers and the insured. See id. For 
reasons immaterial here, both State Farm and Northwestern denied 
Dalton coverage. See id. at 984-85. However, State Farm, acting to 
protect its insured, ultimately investigated and settled all claims. 
See id. at 985. Thereafter, State Farm sued Northwestern on the 
equitable grounds of subrogation, indemnification, and unjust 
enrichment, arguing Northwestern was obligated to pay the claims. See 
id. On these facts, the supreme court could "find no merit in 
Northwestern's argument that State Farm should be foreclosed from 
bringing a subrogation action because State Farm disputed coverage 
under its policy with Puffer." Id. at 986-87. Thus, the supreme court 
held that where two insurers, each having separate contractual 
obligations to cover the same tortfeasor, are in disagreement as to 
which insurer is primarily liable, the insurer that pays the claim to 
protect its insured may bring an equitable subrogation action against 
the second insurer .-*-—'- See id. ; see also National Farmers Union Prop. 
& Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786, 787 
(1963) (allowing one insurer to bring a subrogation action against a 
second insurer to determine primary liability in an accident caused 
by a person that both companies had contracted to insure). The 
County's position finds no support in this holding because the County 
had no contractual relationship with Progressive or with Jensen and, 
therefore, no equitable right to subrogation against Progressive 
under the Policy. 
Ill Other Utah case law is in direct opposition to the County's claim 
of standing. For example, in Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 
1979), our supreme court held that an injured party has no direct 
cause of action in contract against a tortfeasor's insurer because 
the insurer's liability to the injured party "arises only 
secondarily, through its contractual arrangement with the 
[tortfeasor]." Id. at 1039. In the context of an action for 
declaratory judgment, the supreme court in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance 
Co. v. Chuqg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957), held that "one who 
claims to be damaged by the [tortious] act of another" is not "a 
proper party to an action by the insurer of the [tortfeasor] under a 
public liability policy, whereby a declaratory judgment is sought 
declaring the legal effects of the terms of such policy." Id. at 281. 
In fact, the supreme court has "consistently held . . . that [a 
tortfeasor's] insurer [may] not be joined with the tort-feasor unless 
[such was] required by statute." Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 
411, 483 P.2d 447, 448 (1971). 
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512 Some jurisdictions have adopted so-called "direct action 
statutes," allowing an injured party to bring direct action against a 
tortfeasor's insurer. See 7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on 
Insurance 3d. § 104:13 (1997) (citing Dewalt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1938); Jackson v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 23 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. 1945), rev'd on other 
grounds, 29 So. 2d 177 (La. 1946); Thrasher v. United States Liab. 
Ins. Co., 225 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1967); Fehr v. General Accident Fire & 
Life Assurance Corp., 16 N.W.2d 787 (Wis. 1944)). 
113 However, Utah has not adopted this rule. Instead, Utah adheres to 
the "general rule, [that] in the absence of a contractual provision 
or a statute or ordinance to the contrary, . . . the absence of 
privity of contract between the [injured party] and the 
[tortfeasor's] insurer bars a direct action by the [injured party] 
against the [insurer]" in automobile insurance cases. Id. § 104:2 
(footnotes omitted); see also Campbell, 596 P.2d at 1039 ("In Utah, a 
plaintiff must direct his action against the actual tortfeasor, not 
the insurer."). 
114 At least two policy justifications are provided in Utah case law 
for not adopting a direct action rule in Utah. First, "the presence 
of an insurer as a party defendant [with the tortfeasor] might have 
the same effect upon the jury as . . . a liability policy," 
Christensen, 483 P.2d at 448, namely that the jury may improperly 
employ considerations of insurance, as evidenced by the presence of 
an insurer in the litigation, to decide the merits of a case. See 
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846, 848 (1967) ("The 
understanding has always been that it [i]s prejudicial error to 
deliberately inject insurance [information] into . . . a trial."). 
Second, "[i]t is not the policy of the law to encourage litigation." 
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576, 578 
(1967) . 
115 Further, the County lacks standing to bring an action in tort 
against Progressive because Progressive "has committed no act making 
it liable in tort to [the County]." Campbell, 596 P.2d at 1039. 
Indeed, the County does not allege that Progressive committed 
tortious acts against the County.^^ The County's only cause of action 
in tort lies against Jensen, see id., and the County has already 
obtained a default judgment against him. 
516 The County's claim of standing as a third-party beneficiary is 
also unavailing. The facts of the cases upon which the County relies 
for support of its claimed right to recover as a third-party 
beneficiary are distinguishable from the facts of this case, and 
neither holding controls. In Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 
P. 2d 39 (1967), the supreme court granted an interlocutory appeal to 
review a ruling of the trial court "that the defendant in a personal 
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injury action must answer in discovery whether she is insured, and if 
so, the name of the insurer and the amount of coverage." Id. at 39-
40. The court held that because the injured party is 
in effect a third-party beneficiary of the insurance of a wrongdoer 
who injures him, . . . [i]t is only reasonable that the plaintiff 
should have some means of discovering whether a policy exists, and 
what its provisions are so he can know whether covenants upon which 
his rights may depend are being complied with. 
Id. at 41. A plain reading shows that the court's holding applies 
only to the narrow issue of cooperation in discovery. The court did 
not hold, as the County asserts here, that injured third parties have 
a right of direct action against the tortfeasor's insurer. 
117 In Peterson v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 19 Utah 2d 26, 425 
P. 2d 769 (1967), the insurance policy in question "contained the 
usual provision that a judgment creditor of the insured may bring" 
suit directly against the tortfeasor's insurer. Id. at 770. Hence, 
the Peterson holding, which allowed a plaintiff to recover directly 
from the tortfeasor's insurer, came about because the insurer 
consented to such action in the language of the policy. See id. at 
770, 772. 
118 That the County may never collect on its judgment against Jensen 
is unfortunate; but until the Utah Legislature sees fit to adopt a 
rule allowing direct action by an injured party against a 
tortfeasor's insurer, the County has no right of action against 
Progressive directly, and no means to impel Jensen to obtain a 
settlement from Progressive in order to satisfy its judgment. See 
Ammerman, 430 P.2d at 578 ("The privilege of deciding whether to [sue 
one's insurer] should be up to [the tortfeasor] and not up to some 
third party to inject his interest into the matter.") .-^ 7^ 
CONCLUSION 
119 The County cannot bring a cause of action in contract directly 
against Progressive. Also, the County has no means to force Jensen to 
bring a claim against his insurer. Finally, the County has no tort 
claim against Progressive because Progressive has committed no 
tortious act against the County. Accordingly, we hold that the County 
lacks standing to bring its claims against Progressive and, 
therefore, we affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgement for 
Progressive and its denial of summary judgment for the County. 
Judith M. Billings, 
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Associate Presiding Judge 
12 0 WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. The County's brief indicates that Utah Association of Counties 
Insurance Mutual is the County's insurer and the real party in 
interest in this case. 
2. The Policy defined an "accident" as "a sudden, unexpected, and 
unintended occurrence." The Policy also contained an intentional acts 
exclusion clause that excluded coverage for damages caused "by an 
intentional act of an insured person[.]" 
3. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory 
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its 
ruling or action . . . .'" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,110, 52 P.3d 
1158 (citation omitted). 
4. In a prior motion for summary judgment, which the trial court 
denied, Progressive argued (thereby preserving the argument for 
appeal) that the County lacked standing to bring its claims against 
Progressive. 
5. The supreme court cautioned that 
before a court will grant relief, a party must meet the following 
requirements: (1) There must be a debt or obligation for which the 
subrogee was not primarily liable; (2) the subrogee must have made 
payment to protect his own rights or interest; (3) the subrogee must 
not have acted merely as a volunteer; and (4) the entire debt must 
have been paid . . . . Furthermore, subrogation must not work any 
injustice to the rights of others. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'1 Ins. Co., 912 
P.2d 983, 986 (Utah 1996). 
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6. The supreme court in Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979), 
cited the Texas case, Pattison v. Highway Insurance Underwriters, 278 
S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), as an example of the kind of tort a 
tortfeasor's insurer might commit against the injured party so as to 
create a direct action in tort by the injured party against the 
insurer. See id. at 1040. There, "plaintiffs alleged the insurer's 
agents fraudulently misrepresented the amount of coverage provided in 
the defendant's insurance policy, [thereby] inducing plaintiffs to 
sign a release agreement." Id. The County has not alleged any such 
tort by Progressive in this case. 
7. Because our holding that the County lacks standing to bring its 
claims against Progressive is dispositive, we do not reach the other 
issues raised by the County on appeal. 
